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Article
Time to Abolish Implied Assumption of a
Reasonable Risk in California*
By STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN** and JOHN C. BARKER***
IMPLIED ASSUMPTION of risk' is an anachronistic doctrine that
only confuses courts trying to allocate responsibility in negligence
cases.2 The doctrine serves no purpose that is not already served by
other aspects of the prima facie case of negligence. The use of the as-
sumption of risk defense results in a doctrinal double-counting, where
litigants make repetitive arguments under different doctrinal names. The
elimination of implied assumption of risk would avoid this unnecessary
duplication of doctrine and the confusion that has surrounded implied
assumption of risk litigation.
In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,3 the California Supreme Court adopted
comparative negligence and abolished assumption of risk as a separate
negligence defense "to the extent it is merely a variant of the former
doctrine of contributory negligence."'4 The aspect of implied assumption
of risk that was clearly abolished in Li involved assumption by plaintiff of
an unreasonable risk-for instance accepting a ride home from an obvi-
* Some of the authors' views on this subject have been previously expressed in High
Court Tackles Implied Assumption of Risk, San Francisco Banner Daily J., December 26, 1990,
at 5, col. 1. Thanks to John Adler, Trina Grillo, Michael Tobriner, and Catharine Wells for
helpful comments.
** Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law; J.D. Stanford Law
School, 1973; A.B. Stanford University, 1970.
*** Hastings College of Law, Class of 1992; B.A. Williams College, 1978.
1. The defense infers a plaintiff implicitly has agreed, voluntarily and knowingly, to
encounter the defendant's negligence. "By entering freely and voluntarily into any relation or
situation where the negligence of the defendant is obvious, the plaintiff may be found to accept
and consent to it, and to undertake to look out for himself and relieve the defendant of the
duty." W.P. KEETON, D. DOs, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS (5th ed. 1984) at 485 [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS].
2. "It is here that there is the greatest misapprehension and confusion as to assumption
of risk, and its most frequent misapplication." Id. at 484.
3. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
4. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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ously drunk driver, especially when alternatives such as calling a cab or
asking plaintiff's wife to come pick him up, were readily available. 5 A
plaintiff who encounters a risk that is unreasonable in relation to his or
her own safety is contributorily negligent.
Although the court in Li eliminated the doctrinal overlap between
assumption of an unreasonable risk and contributory negligence, the
court still must decide whether any part of the doctrine of implied as-
sumption of risk remains. The aspect of implied assumption of risk that
might theoretically be different from contributory negligence, and there-
fore not addressed by Li, involves the implied assumption by plaintiff of a
reasonable risk.6 The court must decide whether implied assumption of
a reasonable risk warrants treatment as a separate defense in a negligence
case or whether it too should be abolished to avoid doctrinal redundancy
with other aspects of the negligence prima facie case.
The Li court suggested that a separate assumption of risk defense
might remain "where plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant" of
defendant's duty to plaintiff.7 If a separate defense remains when plain-
tiff knowingly and voluntarily agrees to encounter a risk8 that is reason-
5. See Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977). See also
Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 1480-82, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755, 762-63
(1989) (Plaintiff stuntperson was found thirty-five percent contributorily negligent for her
stunt-car injury, because she did not request a readily available seat belt that would have sig-
nificantly diminished her injuries; industry custom dictated that stuntpersons are generally
responsible for overseeing their own safety equipment such as seat belts. Plaintiff's conduct
was thus characterizable both as assumption of an unreasonable risk and as contributory
negligence.).
6. California courts consistently have used the phrase "reasonable implied assumption
of risk" ("RIAR"), rather than "implied assumption of a reasonable risk." See, e.g., Ford v.
Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1609, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 871 (1990), accepted for review,
Supreme Ct. No. S014828; Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 166, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 578, 579 (1983). However, it is the risk that is or is not reasonable, so the more appro-
priate appellation, which this essay uses, is "implied assumption of a reasonable risk."
Reasonableness is tested objectively. Putting the word "reasonable" first in the phrase,
modifying "assumption" instead of "risk," suggests that plaintiff's assumption is being tested
objectively. In fact, assumption of risk is tested subjectively. Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App.
3d at 879, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 505; Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 161-62, 265
P.2d 904, 906 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496A comment d, 496D com-
ment c. Thus, plaintiff could indeed assume a risk that no reasonable person would take, such
as driving with a drunk driver. Gonzalez, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 880-81, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
Therefore, the assumption of risk is subjectively tested, but whether the risk was reasonable is
objectively tested.
7. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
8. Assumption of risk is the "voluntary acceptance of a risk [where] such acceptance...
has been made with knowledge and appreciation of the risk." Prescott, 42 Cal. 2d at 161-62,
265 P.2d at 906 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965)).
[Vol. 25
HeinOnline  -- 25 U.S.F. L. Rev.  648 1990-1991
able in relation to his or her own safety, defendant would be absolved of
any responsibility toward plaintiff resulting from defendant's negligence.
Negligent conduct involves taking unreasonable risks. Decisional
law explains that conduct is negligent when the burden of adequate pre-
caution is low compared to the probability of harm multiplied by the
gravity of harm.9 Thus, unreasonableness is a relative concept that in-
volves examining the nature of the risk, the likelihood of its occurrence,
and the steps required for its prevention.
Just as unreasonableness is relational, so too is the notion of reason-
able conduct. It is not some abstract idea of reason that is relevant, but
rather reasonable conduct by plaintiff in relation to the prima facie case
of negligence being argued against defendant. In each negligence contro-
versy, the prima facie case examining defendant's negligence must be an-
alyzed before the defenses.
A separate defense of implied assumption of a reasonable risk is not
necessary and only leads to a confused analysis in negligence cases.
Rather, a proper analysis of each element of the prima facie case of negli-
gence will yield the appropriate outcome. Defendant can argue that he
or she had no affirmative duty toward plaintiff in the first place, or that
there was no breach of duty, no actual cause, or no proximate cause.
One need not reach affirmative defenses to negligence such as implied
assumption of a reasonable risk unless the prima facie case for negligence
against defendant has first been established. If the prima facie case can
be established and the litigants must turn to defenses, the defense of com-
parative fault should be used to evaluate plaintiff's conduct and to assess
whether defendant's liability should be reduced.
Section I of this article reviews the doctrine of assumption of risk,
express and implied. Section II examines the California cases that have
applied the doctrine of implied assumption of a reasonable risk and illus-
trates how each of them could have been decided using the existing ele-
ments of the prima facie case of negligence. Section III examines three
possibilities for addressing implied assumption of a reasonable risk: 1)
Plaintiff should not be held accountable for his or her reasonable actions
at all; 2) Implied assumption of a reasonable risk is superfluous. Its ele-
ments are accounted for already in the negligence prima facie case and
existing comparative fault defense. No separate defense is needed; 3) Im-
plied assumption of a reasonable risk survives as a separate and complete
defense to defendant's negligence. 10 This article concludes that the de-
9. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). This case contains
Learned Hand's famous articulation of a calculus of risk.
10. Although many decisions have stated that implied assumption of a reasonable risk
Summer 19911 ASSUMPTION OF RISK
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fense should be abolished in order to avoid doctrinal repetition. Sections
IV and V examine the roles of judge and jury and the issue of burden of
proof in relation to implied assumption of a reasonable risk, concluding
that abolishing the doctrine does not damage the balance of interests im-
plicit in the existing tort system.
I. The Doctrine of Assumption of Risk-Express and Implied
Twentieth century tort law marked the transformation of assump-
tion of risk from an "equitable maxim"-volenti non fit injuria-"into a
philosophical principle." " That philosophical principle emphasized "the
individualistic tendency of the common law, which.., naturally regards
the freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole struc-
ture,"12 and served to limit tort liability. 13
Assumption of risk strikes the twentieth-century observer as the arche-
typal doctrine of an age entranced with the idea that each man was
equally capable of protecting himself against injury. In its most ex-
treme applications the doctrine seems almost a parody of itself, an ab-
straction, that from current perspectives, [has] lost all touch with
reality. 14
The doctrine had lost touch with reality because employees in negligently
maintained workplaces, against whom the doctrine was commonly used,
had no real means of bargaining for their own safety and no real choice
about remaining employed under the dangerous conditions.' I
survives as a separate and complete defense to negligence, see infra note 58, the analysis in
those cases has been more in keeping with alternative number two in the text, that implied
assumption of a reasonable risk is accounted for already in the prima facie case. Generally it is
the duty aspect of the negligence prima facie case that these courts have focused on, finding
that implied assumption of a reasonable risk is equivalent to no original duty. See infra note
58. The position of these cases is inconsistent because if no duty is owed, then it is not neces-
sary to reach defenses to negligence; and the need for a separate defense doctrine disappears.
See James, Assumption of Risk- Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 187-88 (1968)
[hereinafter James II].
11. G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 43 (1980). The
maxim translates roughly as "to one who is willing, no harm is done."
12. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, (pts. 1-2), 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 91 (1906)
quoted in WHITE, supra note 11, at 44.
13. WHITE, supra note 11, at 45.
14. Id. at 41. See also the Black and Blue illustration in James II, supra note 10, at 190.
Borrower of defectively designed motorcycle, warned of defect by the lender and reasonably
proceeding to use it, would be barred from recovery against the manufacturer, "even where the
maker's duty to a foreseeable user of the motorcycle was not satisfied by warning." Id.
15. WHITE, supra note 11, at 41.
[Vol. 25
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A. Voluntarily Encountering a Known Risk
Assumption of risk must be voluntary, 16 so defendant must show
that plaintiff knew of the risk and willingly took it.17 Thus, many cases
and commentators point out that assumption of risk is based on con-
sent. 18 Plaintiff is implicitly agreeing to defendant's using less than rea-
sonable care toward him or her. For plaintiff to assume a risk, plaintiff
must be aware of both that specific risk,19 not just of general danger, and
the degree or magnitude of that risk.2°
The doctrine is commonly misconstrued. A pedestrian who dashes
across the middle of a busy street, trying to beat the oncoming cars, is
not assuming the risk of their negligent driving.21 In fact the pedestrian
is assuming that the drivers will be extra careful and alert, slowing down
when they see someone crossing illegally. The pedestrian's conduct is
characterizable as taking a risk, possibly a negligent one, but not as as-
sumption of risk.
Assumption of risk is traditionally tested subjectively.22 Thus,
plaintiff theoretically may assume a risk that the reasonable person
would never assume. This notion affords defendants some advantage,
because where proof of plaintiffs' assumption of risk is available, the de-
fense can be raised successfully even where a reasonable person would
have been irrational or crazy to have agreed to such a risk.23 The use of
16. Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 162, 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965).
17. Assumption of risk is the "voluntary acceptance of a risk [where] such acceptance...
has been made with knowledge and appreciation of the risk." Prescott, 42 Cal. 2d at 161-62,
265 P.2d at 906; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
18. Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 271, 383 P.2d 777, 780, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 193, 196 (1963); Prescott, 42 Cal. 2d at 161, 265 P.2d at 906; Rosenlund & Killion, Once
a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in Cali-
fornia, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 225, 270 (1986).
19. Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 50, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 743 (1990),
accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014818; Vierra, 60 Cal. 2d at 271, 383 P.2d at 780, 32
Cal. Rptr. at 196; Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 245, 418 P.2d 153,
155, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1966); Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 248-51.
The court in Ford inferred from plaintiff's knowledge of area waters, his years of eyperi-
ence water skiing, and his instructions to defendant boat driver, that plaintiff had indeed as-
sumed the risk of being hit by an overhanging branch. Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606,
1620, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 878-79 (1990); but see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C
comment h (1965).
20. Vierra, 60 Cal. 2d at 272, 383 P.2d at 781, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
21. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, uses a similar example at 485.
22. Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 878-79, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1977);
Prescott v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 161-62, 265 P.2d 904, 906 (1954); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A comment d (1965).
23. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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comparative fault where plaintiff's conduct can be characterized as un-
reasonable means that the separate defense of assumption of risk for un-
reasonable conduct by plaintiff is eliminated.24
B. Three Types of Assumption of Risk - Express, Implied
Assumption of a Reasonable Risk, and Implied
Assumption of an Unreasonable Risk
A plaintiff may give express consent, in advance, to relieve a defend-
ant of a legal duty.25 Most jurisdictions conceive express assumption of
risk as distinct from assumption of risk by conduct, or implied assump-
tion of risk.26 California decisions concur that the adoption of compara-
tive fault in the state did not affect express assumption of risk, which thus
remains a complete defense to negligence.27 Thus defendants may pro-
vide and plaintiffs may engage in dangerous activities. With express
waivers available, defendants in theory can offer such activities without
incurring liability or prohibitive insurance costs. 28
Implied assumption of risk is inferred from plaintiff's conduct.
Such behavior may be unreasonable, where plaintiff "carelessly or negli-
gently chooses to encounter a known risk" 29 such as getting into a car
24. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 825, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-41, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 872-73; Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1609-1610, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 871,
(quoting Li, 13 Cal. 3rd at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73); Harrold v.
Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 45-46, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737 (quoting Li, 13 Cal. 3d at
824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73).
25. Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1609, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 871. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 496B (1990).
26. Idaho requires oral or written consent for express assumption of risk, Ford, 217 Cal.
App. 3d at 1616, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 876, whereas Florida does not distinguish between signing a
waiver and acting as though one signed a waiver. Id. at 1611-12, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73;
Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 274-76. The California cases all separate express as-
sumption from implied, although Li itself does not seem to acknowledge a separate category
for express assumption of risk. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
872-73.
27. Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1610, 1621, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 871; Harrold, 218 Cal. App.
3d at 45, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014818.
Most comparative fault jurisdictions leave express assumption of risk as a separate de-
fense. See Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 268 n.237 (list of jurisdictions that leave
express assumption of risk as a separate defense).
28. In addition, some rights to safety involving public facilities cannot be signed away.
See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963).
29. Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1609, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 871 (1990).
[Vol. 25
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with an obviously drunk driver, 30 or such behavior may be reasonable,
where plaintiff goes to a ballgame3' or plays flag football.32
Where plaintiff's behavior is unreasonable or negligent,3 3 the im-
plied assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses overlap.
In this situation, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. held that plaintiff's and defend-
ant's conduct should be compared; therefore implied assumption of an
unreasonable risk is clearly merged into comparative negligence.34
Li v. Yellow Cab incorporated assumption of an unreasonable risk
into comparative fault, but left a separate assumption of risk defense
"where plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant" of defendant's duty
to plaintiff.35 Part of the controversy among appeal courts has been over
this "held to agree" language36 and whether it referred to implied as-
sumption of a reasonable risk.
This problem is made more complex because the line between as-
sumption of an unreasonable risk and a reasonable one is not always
30. See Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 881, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1977).
31. See Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 183-84, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 616 (1986).
32. See Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 175-76, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578,
587-88 (1983).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965) defines contributory negligence as
plaintiff's conduct that "falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own
protection..." and that partly causes plaintiff's injury.
34. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 825, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872-73. See also Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1609-10, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 871;
Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 45-46, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737-38 (1990),
accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014818.
Most comparative fault jurisdictions agree that unreasonable implied assumption of risk is
subsumed into comparative fault. See Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 266 n.236 (list of
comparative fault jurisdictions that subsume unreasonable implied assumption of risk into
comparative fault).
35. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
36. One court applied this language to implied assumption of a reasonable risk. Ford,
217 Cal. App. 3d at 1618, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 877. See also Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18,
at 256.
Another court believed the language referred to implied assumption of an unreasonable
risk. Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 798-99, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900,
903 (1984). This identification with implied assumption of an unreasonable risk seems incon-
gruous, because then Li's explicit treatment of unreasonable conduct would be inexplicably
redundant.
Yet another court believed the language referred to express assumption of risk. Segovi-
ano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 168-70, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83. Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207
Cal. App. 3d 1467, 1478, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755, 760-61 (1989) made a strong argument against
this identification with express assumption, by tracing the "held to agree" language to its
source in Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 410 P.2d 153, 53 Cal. Rptr.
545 (1966). Grey, Von Beltz contends, was addressing only implied assumption of risk, so the
"held to agree" phrase could not include express assumption of risk.
Summer 1991)
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clear. The reasonableness of conduct is an issue about which reasonable
people might differ.37 There are also straightforward examples of behav-
ior universally viewed as reasonable, for which plaintiff has given no ex-
press waiver to relieve defendant from liability: going to a ballgame, 38 or
playing flag or touch football.39 These activities have led to litigation
using the doctrine of implied assumption of a reasonable risk. Thus, the
status and usefulness of implied assumption of a reasonable risk as a sep-
arate defense remain at issue.
II. California Case Law
Certain fact patterns consistently appear in California cases con-
cerning implied assumption of a reasonable risk. Injured plaintiffs in
these cases have been spectators at sporting events, athletic participants,
and workers on dangerous jobs.40 These fact patterns implicate different
issues, yet they have all been analyzed by courts as involving implied
assumption of risk. The cases have in common a plaintiff who knowingly
and voluntarily takes a risk, like the pedestrian who dashes across the
intersection. Athletic participants expect other players to use reasonable
care in relation to their safety; spectators expect that reasonable precau-
tions for their safety have been taken; and workers in dangerous jobs
37. See majority and dissenting opinions in Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 266 Cal. Rptr.
870. The Ford majority thought plaintiff waterskier was not unreasonable skiing barefoot and
backwards in a narrow channel even though an average person certainly would be acting un-
reasonably doing this. Id. at 1620, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79. The majority noted that plaintiff
had skied barefoot and backwards more than 50 times, had 15 years waterskiing experience,
including extensive exposure to area waterways, and had told defendant driver where to go and
how fast. Id.
Conversely, the dissent noted that plaintiff had not mastered crossing a wake. Id at 1623,
266 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (Kline, P.J., dissenting). One might wonder whether plaintiff's stunt
skiing was careless no matter how familiar he was with the area waterways; in fact, if he knew
them so well, perhaps he should have known better than to not look where he was going on
them.
See also Cohen v. McIntyre, 226 Cal. App. 3d 801, 277 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1991) (Kline, P.J.,
dissenting): "reasonable minds will often differ as to whether a particular claimed assumption
of risk is reasonable or unreasonable. Confusion of this sort is one of the reasons that, as the
courts of other states are increasingly coming to realize, 'the term "assumption of risk" is so
apt to create mist that it is better banished from the scene.'" Id. at 811, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 97
(citations omitted).
38. See Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Rptr. 612
(1986).
'39. See Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1986);
Knight v. Jewett, 225 Cal. App. 3d 886, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1990).
40. Professor Frizell contributed the grouping of cases by categories. Frizell, Assumption
of Risk in California: It's Time to Get Rid of It, 16 WESTERN STATE U. L. REV. 627 (1989).
He uses different terms, describing the categories as "vocational assumption of risk," id. at
639, "sporting event assumption of risk," id. at 640, and "spectator assumption of risk." Id.
[Vol. 25
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.believe no unanticipated hazards will occur. The issues raised by these
fact patterns could be resolved without resorting to the assumption of
risk doctrine, by correctly using duty, breach, actual cause, and proxi-
mate cause elements of the negligence prima facie case.
Spectators at sporting events, injured while watching an activity
such as baseball, chose to risk remote injury by attending such an event.
In Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters,4 1 plaintiff was allegedly injured
by a foul ball in the first-base stands at a California Angels baseball
game.42 The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant team
owner, finding that defendant owed no duty beyond providing the 2,300
screened seats already available for fans and that plaintiff assumed the
commonly appreciated risk of being hit by a ball.4 3 This analysis is an
example of the unnecessary doctrinal double-counting of many implied
assumption of risk cases. Where defendant has met the duty to provide
reasonable protection to fans, no prima facie negligence case is estab-
lished. The plaintiff cannot prove prima facie negligence; there is no
need to address the defense of implied assumption of risk.44
Although the Fourth District was comfortable with the trial court's
analysis adopted from a line of baseball cases,45 the appeal court reversed
summary judgment for the defendant because the baseball stadium had
not met its burden of proof regarding duty in this particular case. De-
fendant offered no evidence that any screened seats had been available to
single-ticket purchasers (non-season-ticket holders),46 and although de-
fendant's employee's affidavit had stated the number of screened seats, no
41. 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1984).
42. Id. at 795, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
43. Id. at 796, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
44. Justice Crosby, writing separately, agreed that in an implied assumption of a reason-
able risk situation, since plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence, affirmative
defenses are not reached. Id. at 796-800, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 902-05. The optimal point in this
case to have addressed the issues raised by the defense of implied assumption of a reasonable
risk would have been in plaintiff's prima facie case: here at the point of analyzing defendant's
lack of a duty toward plaintiff.
45. Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, 3 Cal. 2d 725, 729, 46 P.2d 144, 146 (1935) (cita-
tions omitted), set the California standard of care for these baseball cases: spectators who
voluntarily sit in seats not protected by screens or netting assume the risk of being hit; defend-
ant ballparks owe no duty to prevent such possible injuries if "screened seats are provided for
as many as may be reasonably expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion." Brown v.
San Francisco Ball Club, 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 487-88, 222 P.2d 19, 20-21 (1950) followed
Quinn's standard for duty, and found no duty in a similar case involving a baseball injury.
Notice the combination in these cases of an analysis of no duty, indicating that the prima facie
case of negligence has not been proven, with the unnecessary notion of a defense to that prima
facie case.
46. 156 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 202 Cal. Rptr. 901-02.
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evidence showed any correlation between the number provided and the
number requested.47
Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc.,48 another baseball case, in-
volved a plaintiff who claimed that injuries from a foul ball eventually led
to her breast cancer.49 The Second District upheld summary judgment
for defendant, finding no triable issue of fact.50 The unanimous panel
rejected plaintiff's contention that the issue of reasonableness of the
screening protection should go to the fact finder, because the standard of
care was well established and left "no room for a reasonable difference of
opinion." 5
Defendant fulfilled any duty owed to fans by placing a warning on
the backs of tickets, and by providing a minimal number of protected
seats, according to precedent.5 2 The appeal court balanced burdens and
benefits to reaffirm that defendant ballpark owners had two alternatives,
both of which would have been too costly to outweigh the injuries pre-
vented: 1) enclose all seats with expensive wire netting that would ob-
struct views and might even "change the very nature of the game"
because foul balls could no longer be caught by fielders reaching into the
stands; and 2) increase ticket prices, which would "price out" the indi-
gent from "the great American pastime. '53
Neinstein embraced the position that implied assumption of a rea-
sonable risk survived Li's adoption of comparative fault, as a separate
defense. 54 Reiterating that Li merged implied assumption of an unrea-
47. Id.
48. 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1986).
49. Id. at 179 n.1, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n. 1. The appellate decision does not allude to
any of the proximate cause issues such a claim might have raised at trial, although it does
mention that plaintiff received first aid after her injury during the first inning, and then went
back to her seat to watch the rest of the game. Id. at 180, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
50. Id. at 179, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The opinion finds no triable issue of fact, despite the
deference given plaintiff because "[a]ll reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of [the non-
moving party.]" Id.
51. Id. at 182, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (quoting Gregorian v. National Convenience Stores,
Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 944, 948, 220 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1985)).
52. Id. at 181-82, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15. The controlling precedent, Quinn v. Recrea-
tion Park Ass'n, 3 Cal. 2d 725, 729,46 P.2d 144, 156 (1935), set the California standard of care
for these baseball cases: spectators who voluntarily sit in seats not protected by screens or
netting assume the risk of being hit; defendant ballparks owe no duty to prevent such possible
injuries if "screened seats are provided for as many as may be reasonably expected to call for
them on any ordinary occasion." Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 488,
222 P.2d 19, 21 (1950), followed Quinn's standard for duty, and found no duty in a similar
case involving a baseball injury.
53. Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 181, 229 Cal. Rptr.
612, 614 (1986).
54. Id. at 183, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
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sonable risk into comparative fault,55 the Neinstein panel distinguished
consent from fault. If a plaintiff's consent were reasonable, it could not
be faulty, so plaintiff and defendant's conduct should not be compared. 56
Again, discussion of assumption of risk was unnecessary in this case,
where no prima facie case of negligence could be established against de-
fendant. Defendant did not breach the limited duty it owed to plaintiff
and to other patrons to protect them from being hit. Lack of causation
might also have provided a doctrinal vehicle for the no-liability result.
The facts that plaintiff was a longtime Dodgers fan and had even sat in
those seats before57 might have led the court to think in terms of volunta-
riness, knowledge, and implied assumption of risk. The Neinstein line of
cases used both a no-duty analysis and an implied assumption of risk
analysis to reach a defendant's victory, when a conclusion of no duty or
no breach of duty or no actual causation would have sufficed.58 The as-
sumption of risk discussion is superfluous.
55. Id. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824-25, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-41, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 872-73 (1975).
56. 185 Cal. App. 3d at 183, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
57. Id. at 180, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
58. The following California decisions have endorsed this dualistic approach: Hacker v.
City of Glendale, - Cal. App. 3d -, 279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1991); Van Meter v. American
Motor Sports Ass'n, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1198, 278 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1991) (complete defense only
for secondary implied assumption of risk); Krol v. Sampson, 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 164 (1991); Knight v. Jewett, 225 Cal. App. 3d 886, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1990), accepted
for review, Supreme Ct. No. S019021; Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 266 Cal. Rptr.
870 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014828; Nunez v. R'Bibo, 211 Cal. App. 3d
559, 260 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989); Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 755 (1989); Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988);
Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1986);
Nelson v. Hall, 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1985); Rudnick v. Golden West
Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1984) (concurring in holding if not
rationale); Baker v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 710, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1982).
Some other jurisdictions have retained a complete defense of implied assumption of a
reasonable risk, after adopting comparative fault. See, e.g., Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club,
135 Il. App. 3d 429, 481 N.E.2d 1037 (1985) (primary implied assumption of risk, equivalent
to implied assumption of a reasonable risk, not affected by comparative fault); Chapman v.
Craig, 431 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 1988); lepson v. Noren, 308 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1981);
Sandberg v. Hoogensen, 201 Neb. 190, 266 N.W.2d 745 (1978); Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sun-
land, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 734 P.2d 267 (1987); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 510 N.Y.S.2d
49, 502 N.E.2d 964 (1986) (Turcotte effectively ignored New York statute abolishing assump-
tion of risk, by sidestepping it with no-duty analysis; Turcotte retains complete implied as-
sumption of risk defense, despite statute); Siglow v. Smart, 43 Ohio App. 3d 55, 539 N.E.2d
636 (1987); Mima v. City of Akron, 31 Ohio App. 3d 124, 508 N.E.2d 974 (1986); Ott v.
Unclaimed Freight Co., 395 Pa. Super. 483, 577 A.2d 894 (1990); Fish v. Gosnell, 316 Pa.
Super. 565, 463 A.2d 1042 (1983); Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35 (R.I. 1989); Ley-
endecker v. Cousins, 53 Wash. App. 769, 770 P.2d 675 (1989); Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d
645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
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Athletic participants injured while engaging in a sporting activity
usually knew that there was a risk of injury involved in the activity but
chose to engage in it anyway. For example, Segoviano v. Housing Author-
ity59 involved a flag football game sponsored by defendant housing au-
thority. A player pushed plaintiff, who was running for a touchdown out
of bounds, and plaintiff fell, injuring his shoulder.6° The rules provided
that players were prohibited from pushing and could only stop a player
by pulling a flag from that player's belt.61
Plaintiff argued that his knowledge that players might violate the
rules was not a basis for attributing fault to him.62 The trial court said it
would instruct the jury on comparative negligence, but not permit any
reference to assumption of risk.63 The jury returned a verdict for plain-
tiff, "assessing him 30 percent fault and assessing 70 percent fault to the
defendant.' ' 64
The appellate court, interpreting the "held to agree" language from
Li to refer to express assumption of the risk,65 found that "the separate
defense of implied assumption of the risk is abolished under the compara-
tive negligence law."' 66 The court found nothing unreasonable in plain-
tiff's decision to play flag football, and so found the trial court's
contributory negligence instruction erroneous. 67 The appellate court be-
lieved that its holding would "enable the jury to focus its attention on the
real issues in the case: the negligence of the parties who were directly
involved in plaintiff's injury and whether such negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the injury." 68
The Segoviano analysis seems correct to the extent it focuses on the
prima facie case of negligence as the foremost issue to evaluate. If de-
fendant were not negligent, then plaintiff should not recover. Further-
more, if defendant were negligent and plaintiff were not, then as a matter
of law, plaintiff's recovery should not be reduced. But a jury should be
permitted to consider both whether defendant did breach a duty toward
plaintiff and proximately caused the injuries, as well as whether plain-
tiff's conduct was in any way negligent. It would not be fair to prevent
59. 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983).
60. Id. at 165, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 164-65, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
65. Id. at 168, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83.
66. Id. at 169, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
67. Id. at 175-76, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
68. Id. at 175, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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the jury from considering plaintiff's conduct, unless a court found no
negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff may have been reasonable to
choose to play the game, but plaintiff's conduct at the time of the injury
must be examined to determine if it was reasonable at that time.
In Ordway v. Superior Court,69 a professional jockey was injured
when thrown from her horse after another horse crossed in front of her
without sufficient clearance, violating a racing rule.70 The court of ap-
peal found that implied assumption of a reasonable risk survived the
adoption of comparative negligence7 and that plaintiff had reasonably
assumed the risk of her injury.72 The court found that her action was
"barred as a matter of law" and that defendants were "entitled to sum-
mary judgment. '73
The court related the doctrine of assuming a reasonable risk to the
concept of no duty,74 stating:
Where no duty of care is owed with respect to a particular mishap,
there can be no breach; consequently, as a matter of law, a personal
injury plaintiff who has voluntarily-and reasonably-assumed the
risk cannot prevail. Or stated another way, the individual who know-
ingly and voluntarily assumes a risk, whether for recreational enjoy-
ment, economic reward, or some similar purpose, is deemed to have
agreed to reduce the defendant's duty of care.75
Even though the court alluded to this connection between implied as-
sumption of a reasonable risk and the duty element of the prima facie
case, it failed to see that a separate assumption of risk defense is not
necessary to achieve a no-liability result. A no-duty analysis, concluding
that defendant was not negligent because there was no duty, could
achieve that same result, without reaching affirmative defenses. Yet in
athletic participation cases, defendant usually owes a duty to act reason-
ably. At issue in these cases most often is whether defendants acted un-
reasonably, thereby breaching the duty they owed to plaintiff.76
69. 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988).
70. Id. at 101, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
71. Id. at 102, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
72. Id. at 112, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 104, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 539. "The correct analysis is this: The doctrine of
reasonable implied assumption of risk is only another way of stating that the defendant's duty
of care has been reduced in proportion to the hazards attendant to the event." Id.
75. Id.
76. The question of breach of duty, historically, is in the province of the jury. PROSsER
AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 237. See also infra notes 181-189 and accompanying
text.
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Ford v. Gouin 77 involved a water-skier who was injured when he
collided with a tree limb overhanging the water while water-skiing bare-
foot and backwards. 78 The court of appeal held that plaintiff had reason-
ably assumed the risk of encountering such a danger, which relieved
defendant boat driver of his duty to use reasonable care.79
The Ford majority inferred from plaintiff's knowledge of area wa-
ters, years of experience, and instructions to defendant that plaintiff
knowingly assumed the risk of being hit by an overhanging branch 80
The court thus found that implied assumption of a reasonable risk was a
valid defense,8l justifying the no-liability result. Plaintiff's level of expe-
rience actually better supported the kind of assumption of risk that over-
laps with contributory negligence, because if he knew the area and knew
that branches hung over the waterway, 2 he really should have known
better than not to look where he was going.83 If the prima facie case
analysis showed negligence by the defendant, then plaintiff's conduct,
which might have been less than reasonable, is appropriately analyzed by
comparative fault. Again a separate defense of implied assumption of a
reasonable risk was not necessary to analyze the case.
In Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch,8 4 plaintiff's horse suddenly spooked,
while plaintiff's arms were pinned behind her as she was removing her
jacket.85 The evidence showed that the horse had spooked on a previous
ride, but that plaintiff had not been told this fact.8 6 The appeal court
held that the trial court's granting of summary judgment for defendant
was improper, even if assumption of risk remained a separate defense,
77. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct.
No. S014828.
78. Id. at 1608, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
79. Id. at 1619, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
80. Id. at 1619-20, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
81. "The clear California trend has been toward validating RIAR as a defense." Id. at
1619, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
82. Id. at 1620, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
83. However experienced a water-skier plaintiff was, it seems like carelessness for him to
not look where he was going when the angle of the tow line reduced the navigable width of the
channel to 35 feet. Id. at 1619-20, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878. If he knew the waters so well, he had
even more reason to look where he was going. The Ford dissent points out that plaintiff had
not mastered crossing a wake, Id. at 1623, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (Kline, P.J., dissenting), and
also that defendant had strategically reversed its trial court characterization of plaintiff's con-
duct on appeal: at trial, defendant had argued that plaintiff was negligent; on appeal, that
plaintiff had been reasonable. Id. at 1623, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
84. 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1990), acceptedfor review, Supreme Ct. No.
S014818.
85. Id. at 39, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
86. Id.
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because plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the danger involved.87
Because assumption of risk must be voluntary-whether or not the risk is
reasonable-one cannot assume a risk one does not know about.8
While this case could be litigated in terms of plaintiff's knowledge,
using the conventional assumption of risk doctrine, it could also be liti-
gated in terms of breach of a duty to warn plaintiff about the horse's
dangerous propensities. The established doctrines of the negligence
prima facie case are well-suited to analyzing a case such as this, without
need to reach the question of defenses. If the reasonableness of plaintiff's
conduct is at issue, then the defense of comparative fault should be used.
In Knight v. Jewett,89 during an amateur touch football game, plain-
tiff player's finger was crushed by defendant player; the finger was later
amputated. 90 Plaintiff contended that defendant's conduct went beyond
normal bounds of aggressiveness in an informal, coed game and testified
that she, plaintiff, had asked defendant to be less rough.91 The court
used this evidence against plaintiff to show that she must therefore have
appreciated just how aggressively defendant had been playing. 92
A unanimous appellate panel followed Ordway's preservation of im-
plied assumption of a reasonable risk as a complete defense and held that
plaintiff had assumed the risk of contact injuries inherent even in touch
football, especially since she was a football fan and had played touch
football before. 93 Furthermore, even though plaintiff's and defendant's
accounts of the incident differed, the court upheld the trial court's sum-
mary judgment because this "factual dispute ... is immaterial to the
issue of assumption of risk." 94 But the negligence prima facie case must
be examined to ensure an appropriate analysis of the issues raised here.
Did defendant breach a duty to use reasonable care toward plaintiff?
Did the breach actually and proximately cause plaintiff's harm? Was
87. Id. at 50, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
88. Id.; Vierra v. Fifth Avenue Rental Service, 60 Cal. 2d 266, 271, 383 P.2d 777, 780, 32
Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1963); Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 1479-80, 255
Cal. Rptr. 755, 762 (1989). See also Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 644 P.2d 822,
182 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1982), (plaintiff firefighter was misinformed that a chemical accident did
not involve any toxic chemicals, so plaintiff did not assume the risk of toxic-related harm).
89. 225 Cal. App. 3d 886, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1990).
90. Id at 891, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
91. Id at 894 n.3, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296 n.3. The court declined to set a different stan-
dard for implied assumption of risk for amateur sports.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id at 895, 897, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 294, 297. The court also affirmed summary judg-
ment for defendant on plaintiff's assault and battery claim, because plaintiff had consented and
because it saw no evidence that defendant had the requisite intent. Id at 897, 275 Cal. Rptr. at
297-98.
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plaintiff's conduct reasonable? Just because plaintiff took a risk in play-
ing sports does not mean she should not be able to use conventional neg-
ligence doctrine to measure defendant's conduct against a standard of
reasonable behavior under the circumstances.
Similarly, in Krol v. Sampson," the trial court entered summary
judgment against plaintiff who had been injured-by a thrown ball-in a
recreational league softball game, while running from first to second
base.96 Plaintiff appealed, arguing that implied assumption of a reason-
able risk had been eliminated as a defense.97 The appeal court affirmed
the defendant's summary judgment award, finding that implied assump-
tion of a reasonable risk remained as a distinct negligence defense that
can negate the duty element of a negligence cause of action.98
This language is confusing, because a defense does not negate ele-
ments of a prima facie case. Even a second base player starting a double
play must throw to first base reasonably. If a prima facie negligence case
is established, then defenses to negligence must be considered. If the run-
ner acted carelessly with regard to his safety, then comparing fault is
appropriate.
The case reprises the problem of the assumption of risk defense.
Ballplayers have a duty to act reasonably. Reasonable action might be
throwing the ball fast in a double play, even if tragic injury results. That
is the reason for comparing fault. Plaintiff did not slide or otherwise seek
to avoid the throw that he should have realized was coming.
In Van Meter v. American Motorsports Ass'n,99 summary judgment
was granted for defendants when plaintiff suffered injuries working as a
checkpoint captain during a motor vehicle race. 100 The detailed factual
95. 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 278 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1991).
96. Id at 727-28, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 166. Plaintiff was struck in the face by the ball which
broke facial bones and resulted in the loss of his right eye. Id.
97. Id at 736-37, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73. Plaintiff argued alternatively that triable
issues of fact remained ("he could not have assumed the risk unless he knew the second base-
man would throw to first base without looking to see where plaintiff was in the base path"),
even if assumption of a reasonable risk remained as a negligence defense, precluding a sum-
mary judgment. Id.
98. Id at 728-32, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 167-69. Justice White concurred specially. Although
troubled by the implied assumption of risk doctrine, he agreed it exists as a separate defense.
Id at 738, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 174. He raised the concern that the difference between knowing a
risk and knowing its magnitude has been clouded in the case law. Id at 740-41, 278 Cal. Rptr.
at 175-77.
99. 227 Cal. App. 3d 1198, 278 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1991).
100. Id. at 1201, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 289. A checkpoint captain would stop race cars and
mark them as they passed through the checkpoint during the race. Id.
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record showed that plaintiff did not have appropriate staffing at his
checkpoint, but chose to continue with his job during the race. 101
The appeal court reversed summary judgment, showing distaste for
the doctrine of assumption of risk. This case also shows the difficulty
with trying to use categories such as spectator and participant. The
checkpoint captain might be regarded as a spectator to the race, since he
was not driving a car, yet he was a kind of participant in the event, since
his participation was required to conduct the race. Whatever his status,
he had every reason to expect that reasonable care would be used for his
safety. He, like all of these plaintiffs, never agreed that defendants could
use less than reasonable care toward him under the circumstances.
In cases involving dangerous jobs, the plaintiff knows that a risk of
danger is associated with the job, yet performs the task anyway. Often,
defendants owe a duty toward these plaintiffs to use reasonable care, and
that duty is breached. In many cases proximate cause is the real issue: is
it fair to make the defendant pay for the plaintiff's harm?
This dangerous job issue is classically raised by cases involving the
firefighter's rule, which bars police or firefighters from recovering dam-
ages from a party whose negligence proximately caused injury to them
during their rescue work. The theory of the rule is that "one who has
knowingly and voluntarily confronted a hazard cannot recover for inju-
ries sustained thereby." 10 2 In Walters v. Sloan, the court acknowledged
that the rule blurs together "a number of doctrines, including nullifica-
tion of the duty of care, satisfaction of the duty to warn because the
hazard is known, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk."13
The court concluded that "it is unnecessary to attempt to separate the
legal theories or to catalog their limitations." 10 4 Rather than throwing
up its hands at the doctrinal confusion, the court should begin eliminat-
ing repetitive and useless doctrine, starting with implied assumption of
risk.
101. Id. at 1202-03, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91. "After the first vehicle arrived, he knew it
[operating the checkpoint] was unsafe and he might be hurt if a second car hit the stopped one.
However he discounted the chance of injury because he had been working at checkpoints for
so many years." Id. at 1203, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
102. Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 204, 571 P.2d 609, 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155
(1977).
103. Id. A recent court of appeal decision held that although the firefighter's rule did not
bar plaintiff's claim (plaintiff firefighter had been conducting a fire safety inspection when he
slipped on wet steps and broke his arm), the doctrine of reasonable assumption of risk did
prevent his recovery. The dissent objected to the use of summary judgment in the application
of this defense. Donohue v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6217 (May
30, 1991).
104. Id.
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The recent dangerous job cases that have been litigated using the
doctrine of implied assumption of risk have involved dog bites, ladders,
and stunts. The legal result in many of these cases has been to deny
recovery to plaintiffs under the guise of assumption of a reasonable risk.
The theory is used to argue that because it is reasonable to assume a
dangerous job in some situations and because plaintiff voluntarily and
knowingly did so, then defendant should not be responsible. But a no-
liability result can be reached in these cases, if one is desired, using the
doctrine of proximate cause.
The use of assumption of risk in this context reflects a policy deci-
sion by the court that those who undertake dangerous jobs for compensa-
tion should not avail themselves of tort actions. The tort doctrine of
proximate cause, which is part of both the negligence and strict liability
prima facie cases, is a doctrine created to introduce policy consideration
into the evaluation of the prima facie case. 105 A firefighter or veterinar-
ian no-recovery rule could easily be applied by finding defendant's con-
duct was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's harm, again obviating the
need for implied assumption of risk.
Nelson v. Hall 106 and Cohen v. McIntyre 107 both affirmed summary
judgments for defendant dog owners whose dogs had bitten plaintiffs. In
Nelson, plaintiff had sought to establish strict liability under a dog bite
statute;"18 in Cohen, the cause of action was based on negligence. 109 Cit-
ing Nelson for announcing a "veterinarian's rule," 10 the Cohen court
agreed that veterinarians and their assistants assume a risk of being bit-
ten as part of their employment."' Observing that assumption of risk
historically served as a defense to strict liability as well as to negli-
gence, 112 the court found that assumption of risk appropriately barred
recovery.
Two other dangerous job cases, brought by plaintiffs who fell from
ladders, raised different questions involving assumption of a reasonable
risk. Defendant in King v. Magnolia Homeowners Ass'n 113 violated a
safety statute regulating toe space on rooftop access ladders. 114 The stat-
105. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 273.
106. 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1985).
107. 226 Cal. App. 3d 801, 277 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1991).
108. 165 Cal. App. 3d at 711, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
109. 226 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
110. Id. at 806, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
111. Id. at 807, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
112. Id. at 810, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
113. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1312, 253 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1988).
114. King is discussed in Frizell, supra note 40, at 643-45. Frizell comments that assump-
tion of risk is a "less palatable" defense where a plaintiff whose conduct is unreasonable may
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ute required that ladders attached to buildings have a minimum 3 1/2 "
space between the ladder and the building. 115 Plaintiff's expert testified
that adequate toe space was necessary to ensure proper balance in climb-
ing.' 16 In Nunez v. R'Bibo 117 plaintiff gardener borrowed a rickety lad-
der from defendant. Plaintiff climbed the ladder to cut a tree branch,
even though he had noticed that the ladder was "'shaky' or 'loose.' ",118
The branch hit the ladder, which fell, and plaintiff was injured.' 19 Both
courts found the doctrine of implied assumption of a reasonable risk
barred plaintiffs' recovery.
Although the cases appear to have parallel fact patterns, they should
be analyzed very differently, beginning with the prima facie case of negli-
gence in each. Defendant's negligence in King was established by a statu-
tory violation, a particularly insidious kind of negligence that as a matter
of public policy should not go unnoticed. 120 Defendant's negligence in
Nunez was illusive; evidently defendant's only conduct was to loan a
rickety ladder to plaintiff. Nunez is a case in which it was hard to estab-
lish a negligence prima facie case; King had a strong negligence prima
facie case based on the statutory violation, and defenses to negligence
should have been considered. In King, plaintiff's conduct in climbing the
dangerous ladder should have been weighed to reduce his recovery. But
the doctrine of implied assumption of a reasonable risk is again unneces-
sary to an analysis of these cases. The existing negligence doctrines avail-
able for evaluating the negligence prima facie case and defenses suffice.
Finally, consider Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc.,121 which originated
during filming of the movie "Cannonball Run," when plaintiff stuntper-
son was paralyzed below her neck in a car crash on the second take of a
stunt. 122 Plaintiff knew from the first take that the car had no seat
belts. 123 She could have requested that belts, which were readily avail-
able, be installed. 124 The trial court jury found her thirty-five percent
now recover under comparative fault, but a reasonable plaintiff is totally barred from any
recovery. Id. at 645. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
115. 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1314, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42.
116. Id. at 1315, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 14142.
117. 211 Cal. App 3d 559, 260 Cal. Rptr 1 (1989).
118. Id at 562, 260 Cal. Rptr at 1.
119. Id. at 562, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
120. See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1970) (stretching the doctrine of actual causation by shifting the burden of proof to defendant
who had been a statutory violator).
121. 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1989).
122. Id. at 1476, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
123. Id. at 1482, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
124. Id. Evidently, at least 10 seat belts were available at the scene and would have taken
no more than 20 minutes to install. Industry custom dictates that stuntpersons oversee their
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contributorily negligent for not so requesting, and the appeals panel
found no reason to disturb the finding, noting that plaintiff had sufficient
opportunity to take precautions that industry custom delegated to
stuntpersons, and that the need for such precautions was obvious. 125 The
court reconfirmed that where assumption of risk overlapped with con-
tributory negligence, such as with plaintiff's disregard of her seat belt
protection, Li had merged the assumption defense into comparison of
fault. 126
Where plaintiff's assumption was of a reasonable risk, however, Von
Beltz adopted Ordway's repetitive dual analysis, finding that defendant
either owed no duty toward plaintiff and/or plaintiff assumed the risk. 127
In spite of this theoretical holding, the court affirmed the finding below
that plaintiff had not assumed that specific risk.128 In this case, plaintiff
had not been told of material changes in the stunt decided on between the
two takes, and one cannot assume an unknown risk.129 Thus the court
recognized the theoretical possibility of a defense of implied assumption
of a reasonable risk, but in reality the fact pattern did not fit that
defense. '30
own safety equipment and that stuntpersons have control over safety precautions such as seat
belts.
125. Id. at 1480-85, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 763-65.
126. Id. at 1477, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
127. Id. at 1477-79, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61, states the popular position that implied
assumption of a reasonable risk survived Li as a complete defense. The court does stress that it
agrees with Ordway as far as the latter's no-duty analysis, Id. at 1477-78, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 760-
61, thus endorsing the separate implied assumption of a reasonable risk defense somewhat
equivocally.
128. Id. at 1480, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 762. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
129. Id. See also Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734
(1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014818, (plaintiff did not assume risk of equine
injury because she was not told of the horse's known tendency to spook); Lipson v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 644 P.2d 822, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1982), (plaintiff firefighter was mis-
informed that a chemical accident did not involve any toxic chemicals, so plaintiff did not
assume risks of toxic-related harm).
130. Another recent dangerous job case, Hacker v. City of Glendale, - Cal. App. 3d -,
279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1991), in which a tree trimmer was electrocuted by high voltage power
lines that passed through the branches of a tree he was cutting, Id. at 372, approved the use of
implied assumption of a reasonable risk as a complete bar to recovery. Id. at 374-75. The
dissent lamented: "As construed and applied by the majority in this case, the assumption of
the risk defense resurrects the discredited and discarded defense of contributory negligence in
all-or at least nearly all-its 'glory.'" Id. at 376-77.
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III. Possible Resolutions for the Implied Assumption of a
Reasonable Risk Problem
From these cases, three positions have emerged as the courts wrestle
with the doctrine of implied assumption of a reasonable risk. The first
position states plaintiff should not be held accountable for his or her rea-
sonable actions at all. The second position finds that implied assumption
of a reasonable risk is superfluous. Its elements are accounted for al-
ready in the negligence prima facie case and existing comparative fault
defense. No separate defense is needed. The third view holds that im-
plied assumption of a reasonable risk survives as a separate and complete
defense to defendant's negligence. Most decisions have taken overlap-
ping positions, contributing to the confusion surrounding this doctrine
and illustrating why judicial clarification is essential.
A. Plaintiff Should Not Be Held Accountable for His or Her
Reasonable Actions at All
Segoviano v. Housing Authority,13 1 involving a flag-football injury,
held that implied assumption of a reasonable risk "plays no part in the
comparative negligence system of California."'' 32 The court continued:
[1]t is neither a bar to plaintiff's recovery on the theory that it fore-
closes the existence of a duty of care by the defendant toward the
plaintiff nor is it a partial defense justifying allocation of a portion of
the fault for the accident to the plaintiff on the theory that he or she
was contributorily negligent in confronting the risk.133
The implication of this approach goes too far. A failure to evaluate
plaintiff's conduct provides defendants no protection at all unless plain-
tiff has signed an express waiver. For example, a hockey rink owner
would be fully liable for any injury from a stray puck, provided that the
injured spectator had acted reasonably in attending the game and that a
prima facie case of negligence could be proved. 34 Such liability would
be the functional equivalent of strict liability. Imposing such liability
simply because the accident happened would put owning a skating rink
on a par with blasting or other activities that have been regarded as ab-
normally dangerous.1 35
131. 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983).
132. Id at 164, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
133. Id.
134. If the spectator was reasonable in watching the game, the rink owner was probably
also reasonable in providing the game to be seen. Absent any proof of prima facie negligence,
the need for any defense evaporates.
135. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 549-50.
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Plaintiffs should ultimately be responsible for their behavior, no
matter how careful it is, just as defendants should be responsible for
their's. As long as the spectator seats behind each goal, up to a certain
predictable height for lifted shots, are protected with plexiglass, the rink
owner cannot be responsible for every inattentive spectator or stray shot.
No duty is owed to these spectators, because the burden of closing off the
entire rink outweighs the chance that a patron will be sufficiently unob-
servant and unfamiliar with the game to be inattentive.
The Segoviano court correctly pointed out that allowing implied as-
sumption of reasonable risk to remain a complete bar to recovery, while
comparing implied assumption of unreasonable risk, punishes reasonable
behavior.1 36 The reasonable plaintiff's award is totally barred, while the
unreasonable plaintiff's award is merely reduced, allowing some recovery
for unreasonable behavior, depending on the jury's comparison.1 37 If
and when a prima facie negligence case is established, then plaintiff's
conduct, whether reasonable or unreasonable, should be compared to
that of defendant.
Ford and Ordway contended that such rewarding of unreasonable
conduct is "only superficially anomalous"'' 3 and that the focus should be
on defendant's expectations, not on plaintiff's behavior. Thus, defendant
should be able to ignore reasonable risks and let plaintiff guard against
them (e.g., it should be up to plaintiffs to protect themselves against their
own normal sports injuries); on the other hand, defendant should antici-
pate unreasonable risks and take precautions.' 39 This shift of focus does
not really rebut Segoviano's point that retaining a separate defense for
implied assumption of a reasonable risk punishes reasonable behavior.
Also, defendant in some ways is in a better position to guard against
reasonable risks than unreasonable ones, because the former are more
predictable: for example, defendant rink owner should certainly put up
plexiglass directly behind the goals, or require that players wear appro-
priate padding. An appropriate analysis of the prima facie negligence
136. Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 169, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See Ford v. Gouin, 217
Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1610, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 872 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No.
5014828; Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 44, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 739 (1990),
accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S01488; Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 280.
Rosenlund and Killion observe that plaintiff is not exactly "rewarded" for unreasonable behav-
ior, because plaintiff's recovery is still reduced; this sidesteps Segoviano's point that plaintiff is
being punished for reasonable behavior, because partial recovery is better than no recovery.
See also Frizell, supra note 40, at 643-45.
137. Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 169, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
138. Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1613, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (1990); Ordway v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 104-06, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539-40 (1988).
139. Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1613, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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case can incorporate these considerations. If defendant has been negli-
gent, then plaintiff should be accountable for his or her conduct, which
should be evaluated under comparative fault principles.
B. Implied Assumption of a Reasonable Risk Is Superfluous
The doctrine of implied assumption of a reasonable risk is superflu-
ous in tort law. A proper analysis of the prima facie case of negligence
will require addressing all issues that might be raised under the doctrine
of implied assumption of a reasonable risk. Any issues that might not be
addressed as part of the prima facie negligence case can easily be ad-
dressed by the doctrine of comparative fault.
1. Analysis of the Prima Facie Case of Negligence Accounts for All
Relevant Issues
Several decisions have recognized that a proper analysis of plain-
tiff's prima facie case of negligence resolves the issues traditionally ad-
dressed under the doctrine of assumption of risk, but have incongruously
retained the separate defense. 14° As Fleming James has explained, if
prima facie negligence cannot be established, then the assumption of risk
defense is redundant:
[T]he concept of assuming the risk is purely duplicative of other more
widely understood concepts, such as scope of duty or contributory neg-
ligence .... Except for express assumption of risk, therefore, the term
and the concept should be abolished. It adds nothing to modem law
except confusion.141
This confusion is apparent in the Ford and Ordway line of cases. James
identifies two categories of assumption of risk: primary assumption of
140. For a list of decisions that have endorsed this dualistic approach, see supra note 58.
141. James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 169 (1952) [hereinafter James I].
Other jurisdictions have subsumed implied assumption of a reasonable risk into their
comparative fault systems, so that implied assumption is no longer a separate defense: See,
e.g., Bryant v. Eifling, 301 Ark. 172, 782 S.W.2d 580 (1990); Simmons v. Frazier, 277 Ark.
452, 642 S.W.2d 314 (1982); Wendland v. Ridgefield Constr. Servs., Inc., 190 Conn. 791, 462
A.2d 1043 (1983); Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989); Ford, 217 Cal.
App. 3d at 1616 ("Assumption of risk had outgrown its ancient purpose of insulating employ-
ers from the cost of human injury in industrialized business," so Idaho found the all-or-noth-
ing rule unfair, and abolished assumption of risk.); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d
1123 (La. 1988) (on certification from 5th Cir., 821 F.2d 272); Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field
Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 650 P.2d 772 (1982); Christensen v. Murray, 296 Or. 610, 678
P.2d 1210 (1984) (abolished fireman's rule; Oregon has modified comparative fault) [Oregon
followed its statute abolishing assumption of risk, including assumption of risk "as a shorthand
phrase for D's lack of duty under the circumstances .... " Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1616
(quoting Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Dev. Corp., 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d 827, 832 (1981));
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387
S.E.2d 511 (W.Va. 1989) (West Virginia has modified comparative fault); Kirk v. Washington
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risk, which is a recasting of the absence of any duty, and secondary as-
sumption of risk, which considers plaintiff's fault. 142 In California case
law, James's secondary assumption of risk would be roughly equivalent
to the assumption of risk that overlaps with contributory negligence.1 43
Within this simple framework, one needs first to determine if de-
fendant was negligent: For example in Harrold,144 did defendant horse
owner fulfill the duty to tell plaintiff rider about the horse's volatile dis-
position, and if not, did that omission cause plaintiff's injury? Only if
negligence is found, would one then inquire whether plaintiff's conduct
contributed to the accident, and accordingly compare the fault of the
parties.
The Ford and Ordway line of cases focused on the duty element of
the prima facie case. However, other elements of the prima facie case
might also be used to resolve the traditional assumption of risk issues.
For example, ice hockey was a relatively new sport in California in the
1930s, and the risk of being hit by a puck was not well known. Rink
owners introducing the sport would have had a duty to warn patrons of
the risk.145 But suppose that the injured plaintiff had been an avid ice
hockey fan from Minnesota. Some would say that such a patron had
State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo.
1979).
Various jurisdictions have modified the separate assumption of risk defense: See, e.g.,
Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977)
[See Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1611-12, for discussion of Kuehner and Blackburn: Florida
relabels RIAR as "express" assumption of risk. Express assumption of risk (including
equivalent of RIAR) is still a complete defense]; Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 381
S.E.2d 283 (1989) (assumption of risk must go to jury, so no summary judgment); Jackson v.
Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278, 680 P.2d 877 (1984) (upholding "fireman's rule" assumption of
risk); Smith v. Blakey, 213 Kan. 91, 515 P.2d 1062 (1973) (implied assumption of risk defense
limited to master-servant cases; in other cases, implied assumption of risk neither merged with
contributory negligence nor available as a defense); Brubach v. Almy, 520 A.2d 334 (Me.
1987) (defendant can assert assumption of risk or contributory negligence defenses only for
non-business exemption cases); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976) (voluntary as-
sumption of risk abolished by comparative fault); Melendres v. Soales, 105 Mich. App. 73, 306
N.W.2d 399 (1981) (implied assumption of risk only in master-servant cases; workers' com-
pensation therefore abolishes assumption of risk); McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303 (Miss.
1990); Singleton v. Wiley, 372 So. 2d 272 (Miss. 1979) (instructions for both contributory
negligence and implied assumption of an unreasonable risk are acceptable); Ballard v. Happy
Jack's Supper Club, 425 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1988) (assumption of risk is jury question).
142. James I, supra note 141, at 141.
143. See also Frizell, supra note 40, at 246, stressing the importance of the difference be-
tween primary and secondary assumption of risk.
144. Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1990), accepted
for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014818.
145. See Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal. App. 2d 364, 97 P.2d 999 (1930) (risk of flying
puck "not common knowledge").
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assumed the risk of being hit and that plaintiff's recovery should be
barred. But the doctrine of assumption of risk is not necessary to reach
the correct no-liability result. The breach by the rink owners of the duty
to warn would not have actually caused the harm, because the fan had
the knowledge that the warning would have brought. 46 Once again the
need for a separate doctrine of assumption of risk is rendered superfluous
by the existing doctrines of the prima facie case of negligence.
Prosser uses as an example of assumption of risk a case involving a
government inspector during wartime who is injured by an explosion
while on the job at defendant's munitions plant. 47 The case involved the
question of defendant's strict liability, and the court reached the no-lia-
bility result by finding strict liability did not apply. 48 The case's holding
on strict liability doctrine is curious, 149 and similar facts involving an
explosion would likely implicate strict liability for an abnormally danger-
ous activity in American jurisprudence. 50 If strict liability were found,
would a doctrine of assumption of risk be required to reach a no-liability
result? Again, assumption of risk is unnecessary because the policy doc-
trine of proximate causation could yield a no-liability result by finding as
a policy matter that wartime munitions inspectors could not recover for
work-related injuries.' 5 '
2. The Existing Defense to Negligence, Comparative Fault, Is
Sufficient
The tone of Li v. Yellow Cab Co. was inclusive; the court wanted to
incorporate more rather than less into comparative fault.' 52 One policy
objective behind softening the all-or-nothing finality of both the assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence defenses had been to avoid the
inequitable result that a defendant ninety-nine percent at fault might es-
146. Special thanks to Professor Marc Franklin, Stanford Law School, for this example
and many conversations about assumption of risk.
147. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 548 (discussing Read v. J. Lyons
& Co., [1947] A.C. 156).
148. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 548. (Strict liability limited "to
cases in which there has been an 'escape' of a dangerous substance from land under the control
of the defendant.").
149. Id. ("The decision appears definitely out of line with other English cases ... .
150. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini, 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520.
151. Cf Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 204, 571 P.2d 609, 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155
(1977) (firefighter's rule).
152. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824-25, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872-73 (1975). See Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1627, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 883-
84 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014828 (dissent believed implied assumption
of risk should be abolished).
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cape liability because plaintiff was one percent to blame. The protection
of fledgling industry is no longer as essential as it arguably was at the
start of this country's Industrial Revolution, 153 while protection and
compensation for plaintiff consumers may be an important role of the
tort system, 154 rendering complete defenses to negligence anachronistic
in a post-industrial setting. Over the past 30 years, the California
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed cost-sharing approaches to lia-
bility, which consider a party's ability to pay and spread, its costs (for
example, to its customers) as a prime factor in determining which party
should pay.' 55
In Daly v. General Motors Corp., the supreme court sanctioned the
comparison of fault and no-fault based conduct. 5 6 Even the Ford major-
ity acknowledged that if the court allowed a jury to compare these con-
ceptually disparate measurements of responsibility, the court should not
balk at the easier comparison of plaintiff's and defendant's respective
fault.157 These policy considerations militate in favor of comparing fault
rather than barring recovery entirely, once affirmative defenses are
reached.
153. See Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1615, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 875; Rosenlund & Killion,
supra note 18, at 226; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 292 (1850).
154. Englard, The System Builder" A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980), discusses the conflicting purposes of the tort system, including
corrective justice, deterrence, victim compensation, and loss spreading. Id. at 27-28. But see S.
SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 6-24 (1989) (arguing that consum-
ers are not adequately protected by the tort system). See also Wildman, Enlightened Social
Insurance in a World Made Safer, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 877, 881 (1990) (book review) (ex-
pressing concern that abolishing tort law may adversely impact safety).
155. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407
(1979) (recovery upheld for defendant's negligent delay in airport facility construction, where
economic disadvantage from delay was foreseeable, even though plaintiff and defendant not in
privity); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976) (therapist has duty to protect identifiable third party from harm foreseeably caused
by therapist's patient); Barker v. Lull, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)
(when plaintiff proves defect caused harm in strict products liability case, burden of proof
shifts to defendant to show benefits outweighed risks of such design); Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (landowners owe duty to use reasonable
care toward any person foreseeably injured on their land); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (establishing a cause of action for
strict liability for defective products because defendants better able to pay costs of injuries).
156. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-69, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978).
157. Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1617, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 877. However, the court's current
composition, different from that at the time of Daly in 1978, may lead to a different outcome
when the case is heard.
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Some commentators argue that since assumption of risk is based on
consent rather than fault,158 plaintiff's conduct should not be compared
to defendant's. 15 9 They analogize plaintiff's assumption of risk to plain-
tiff's making a contract, and assert that "agreements are either enforcea-
ble or unenforceable."1 60 They suggest that the position of retaining an
express assumption of risk defense while not retaining an implied as-
sumption of risk defense, is inconsistent with the equal enforceability of
express and implied contracts.161
This analogy leaves consideration and other elements in contract
law unaddressed.1 62 Another writer also approaches implied assumption
of risk as an implied contract issue, identifying defendant's duty as de-
fendant's consideration.1 63 While this analogy has some merit, it does
not adequately preserve the line between bargain and accident that,
among other elements, characterizes the line between contract and tort
law. More significantly, the differences in available remedies reflect the
traditional policy that an accident deserves compensation, while remu-
neration is spelled out in a true bargain. A bargain is conceptually differ-
ent from implying an assumption of risk, just as contract law's goal of
returning the parties to their bargained-for positions is distinct from tort
law's several goals of compensation, deterrence, and loss-spreading.
Arguably one could partially consent to a certain risk. For example,
consider Von Beltz,164 in which plaintiff stuntperson suffered partial pa-
ralysis from an accident filming "Cannonball Run." Stuntpersons are
expected to contribute to their own standard safety precautions, accord-
ing to industry custom, and defendant company provided seat belts at the
scene. 165 An independent analysis of plaintiff's implied assumption of
the foreseeable risks from not wearing a belt is redundant. However,
defendant altered the layout of the stunt between the unsatisfactory first
take and the ill-fated second take, by directing the driver of plaintiff's car
158. Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 270. See also Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental
Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 271, 383 P.2d 777, 780, 32 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1963).
159. Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 279 ("the defense [should] remain a complete
bar where the risk assumed is reasonable").
160. Id. at 270-71.
161. Id at 240, 273.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B comment a, alludes to "non-contractual
consent," thus also distinguishing the two concepts.
163. Freedman, Assumption of Risk Is Really Just a Contract Question, San Francisco
Banner Daily J., Jan. 10, 1991, at 5, col. 1 (letter to the editor).
164. Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1989). See
also supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
165. 207 Cal. App. 3d at 1476, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
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to drive into oncoming traffic rather than around it on the shoulder. 166
Defendant withheld this material change from plaintiff, thereby breach-
ing a duty to inform her of such alterations, which might have persuaded
her to have belts installed or even to turn down the job. 167 Without this
knowledge, her consent to the job might be characterized as an example
of partial consent.
More significantly, even if one concedes that consent must only be
all or nothing, a jury could still consider both parties' respective responsi-
bilities for the injury and then award damages by comparing fault. By
using the comparative fault doctrine, it becomes unnecessary for courts
to examine whether consent is fully or only partially established. Argua-
bly, defendant breached the duty to let the stuntpersons know of signifi-
cant changes in the stunts; plaintiff convinced the court that defendant's
negligence caused plaintiff's injuries; and plaintiff's careless failure to
have seat belts installed reduced her recovery by thirty-five percent. 168
The whole analysis can be accomplished without any need for a separate
defense of implied assumption of risk.
C. Implied Assumption of a Reasonable Risk Survives as a Separate
and Complete Defense to Defendant's Negligence
This position, retaining implied assumption of risk as a separate de-
fense, is taken by most California appeal courts169 and by law review
commentators Paul Rosenlund and Paul Killion. 170 The California
Supreme Court expressed interest in this view, directing the Fourth Dis-
trict in Ordway17 ' to New York's Turcotte v. Fell, 72 which combined a
no-duty analysis 73 with retention of a complete assumption of risk de-
fense. Ford inferred that this gesture indicated the supreme court's "tacit
approval" for this position.' 74
166. Id
167. Id. at 1479, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
168. Id. at 1480-83, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 762-64.
169. For a list of decisions that have endorsed this dualistic approach, see supra note 58.
170. Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18.
171. Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 101, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 537 (1988).
172. 68 N.Y.2d 432, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1986).
173. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
174. Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1619, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 878 (1990), accepted
for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014828. The supreme court supported the firefighter's rule, bar-
ring firefighter's recovery for negligence in the creation of a fire that led to injury on the job,
after Li. Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 371, 644 P.2d 822, 829-31, 182 Cal. Rptr.
629, 635-38 (1982); Hubbard v. Boelt, 28 Cal. 3d 480, 484-85, 620 P.2d 156, 159, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 706, 708-09 (1980). Firefighter's rules have been viewed as a form of assumption of risk
warranting a no-liability result. Notice that the same no-liability result may be achieved by the
use of traditional proximate cause doctrine, finding it would not be fair to make the negligent
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Rosenlund and Killion are not satisfied with the second approach,
which they label "abolitionist." 175 To them, James's characterization of
primary assumption of risk-the mirror image of lack of duty-and sec-
ondary or unreasonable assumption of risk, which overlaps with contrib-
utory negligence, is not complete because implied assumption of a
reasonable risk fits neither category. 176 Thus, since the abolitionists can-
not account for all implied assumptions of risk, implied assumption of a
reasonable risk deserves to be an independent defense. 177 But whenever
each element of the negligence prima facie case is examined, including
the comparative fault defense, the need for a separate assumption of risk
defense evaporates.
They offer a ballpark injury example 178 to illustrate that because the
no-duty analysis, overlapping contributory negligence, and express as-
sumption of risk together cannot account for all assumption of risk, im-
plied assumption of a reasonable risk must be retained as a separate
defense. Plaintiff spectator P sits voluntarily in ballpark seats without
protective netting (e.g., bleacher seats). Defendant park owner D owes a
duty to protect foreseeable plaintiffs, including P, so a no-duty analysis
does not apply to D. P's conduct was not unreasonable or careless, and
P signed no waiver, so D is liable.
In this example, D has breached no duty to P sitting in the bleach-
ers, as a matter of law. Although it is indeed foreseeable that home run
balls will land in bleacher seats, the burden on ballpark owners (to cover
all seats with netting) is too great when juxtaposed to the minor risk that
unusually inattentive spectators might be hit. And so the breach element
of the negligence prima facie case disposes of the issue.
Another alternative would be to hold that D owed no duty as a
matter of law, relying on the duty element to dispose of the issue. Rud-
nick dicta affirmed that a no-duty analysis is as appropriate for baseball
spectator cases as is an implied assumption of a reasonable risk analysis:
"Schwartz... would abandon the plaintiff's [implied assumption of a
reasonable risk] theory in favor of an eliminated or diminished duty of
care by the defendant: 'a number of fact patterns that look like [implied
assumption of a reasonable risk] may still result in a verdict for defend-
defendant pay for plaintiff's harm when plaintiff was a firefighter injured in the course of
employment.
175. Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 234, 237.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 242-44.
178. Id.
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ant [under a comparative fault system] if they are recast under the duty
concept.' "179
Keeping implied assumption of a reasonable risk as a complete de-
fense imposes a strategic dilemma on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs can only avoid
reduction of recovery through comparison of fault, by showing that their
conduct was reasonable, yet if their behavior was reasonable and they
voluntarily and knowingly accepted a risk, any recovery would be com-
pletely barred. Plaintiffs need to demonstrate unreasonable behavior to
avoid the implied assumption of a reasonable risk total bar to recovery,
resulting in a reduction of recovery through comparative fault. 80 Much
unnecessary litigation about reasonable and unreasonable conduct could
be avoided by following the Li mandate to compare fault of the parties in
accident litigation where the question of defenses is reached.
IV. The Roles of Judge and Jury
Traditionally, the fact finder determines both the reasonableness of
plaintiff's actions and the assumption of risk. 81 Nevertheless, confusion
about the doctrine of assumption of risk has led courts, struggling to
apply the doctrine, to usurp the traditional role of the jury. For example,
the court in Ford upheld summary judgment for defendant, finding that
plaintiff had assumed the risk, thereby depriving the fact finder of a
chance to consider that question. Summary judgment is appropriate
where there is "no material issue of fact,.. . and the sole issue remaining
is one of law."' 8 2 Where "the navigable width of the channel was be-
tween 65 and 90 feet" and the angle of the tow line reduced that width
"an additional 55 to 67 feet,"' I8 3 it is difficult to regard the reasonableness
of plaintiff's water-skiing backwards and barefoot as not raising a ques-
tion of fact. Contrary to the court's holding, it appears that plaintiff's
conduct could easily be described as contributorily negligent and should
be treated under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
179. Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 798-800, 202 Cal. Rptr.
900, 903 (1984) (quoting SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.4, pp. 168-69 (1974)).
(Emphasis in the original) Rosenlund and Killion even state that "If a risk is so obvious it is
reasonably foreseeable a plaintiff will take protective measures against it, a duty analysis may
be more appropriate .... " Supra note 18 at 243. It is not clear why their own ballpark
example would not be just such a situation.
180. See Glassford, Assumption of Risk on Trial, California Lawyer, Jan. 1991, at 57.
181. Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 274, 383 P. 2d 777, 783, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 193, 197-99 (1963); Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218 Cal. App. 3d 36, 49, 266 Cal. Rptr.
734, 742 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No. S014818; Rosenlund & Killion, supra
note 18, at 252; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D comment e.
182. Ford v. Gouin, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1621, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 879 (1990).
183. Id. at 1619-20, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
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The Harrold court reversed a summary judgment favoring defend-
ant, ' 8 4 who did not controvert plaintiff's allegation of the horse's propen-
sity to spook or demonstrate plaintiff's knowledge of that particular risk
and its magnitude. 185 The court here could decide if the horse ranch had
an obligation to warn plaintiff rider. If so, the fact finder could then
determine if the breach proximately caused the injury. If defenses are
reached, the fact finder could consider plaintiff's and defendant's relative
degrees of fault, and apportion liability accordingly. 186
The existence of duty is usually a question of law.187 Some courts
favor resolution of plaintiff's assumption of risk as a duty issue because
they want the court to control the finding. For example, baseball injuries
are so universally handled with a no-duty analysis or its equivalent, s8
that ad hoc jury determination could lead to arbitrariness and inconsis-
tency of outcomes. Ford approved of the expedition of cases gained by
no-duty analysis.189 In situations where there is no question of fact, this
analysis is sufficient and retains appropriate judicial control. The use of
no-duty analysis requires no separate defense of implied assumption of
risk, merely an appropriate analysis of the negligence prima facie case.
V. Burden of Proof
The placement of the analysis of plaintiff's reasonable behavior,
either as part of the negligence prima facie case or as an affirmative de-
fense, affects the parties' burdens of proof. Plaintiff has the burden of
proving each element of the prima facie case of negligence, including de-
fendant's duty, and defendant traditionally bears the burden of showing
plaintiff's fault or assumption of risk.'190 The side opposing summary
judgment also has a burden to produce some evidence contrary to the
184. Harrold, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
185. Id. at 49-50, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43.
186. The court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978) thought juries capable of the conceptually challenging comparison of fault
and no-fault, indicating faith in juries' competency. See supra note 156 and accompanying
text.
187. Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 801, 202 Cal. Rptr.
900, 905 (1984). See Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1618, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
188. Rudnick, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 801-02, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06. Ford, 217 Cal. App.
3d at 1618, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 877 alludes to the "safety valve of 'no duty'" (quoting from
Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975 Forward: Comparative Negligence at
Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239, 266 (1976)).
189. Ford, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1618, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
190. James I, supra note 141, at 168.
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moving side's evidence, in order to get beyond summary judgment by
demonstrating a triable controversy.191
Commentators argue against abolishing implied assumption of a
reasonable risk because "abolishing assumption of risk in favor of a
[no-]duty analysis would have the effect of shifting the traditional burden
of proof [which defendant would ordinarily bear for implied assumption
of risk] from the defendant to the plaintiff."1 92 But plaintiff must prove
the prima facie case anyway, so requiring plaintiff to prove the negligence
case and then analyzing defenses as suggested by this article, adds noth-
ing to plaintiff's burden. 193
Eliminating the implied assumption of risk defense would indeed
remove defendant's burden of proving an affirmative defense, although
defendant still must controvert plaintiff's claims that defendant owed a
breachable duty. Where defendant's negligence has been shown, incor-
poration of plaintiff's fault into comparative fault helps plaintiff by trans-
forming what might otherwise be a total loss into a reduced recovery.
Requiring negligent defendants to compensate injured plaintiffs remains
well within the premise of tort law.
The post-industrial, pro-plaintiff trend away from the classic com-
mon law "Bad Samaritan Rule"' 94 has broadened the concept of duty
and increased responsibilities for defendants.' 95 Negligence jurispru-
dence pursues fairness by the policy choices underlying the limitation or
expansion of both duty196 and proximate causation. It is these explicit or
subtle policy determinations that will ultimately favor plaintiff or defend-
ant, regardless of which side is assigned the burden of proof at different
stages of a negligence action. For example, compare the policy choices in
recent California products liability cases 97 with those in the ballpark
cases' 98 discussed above; courts have needed only the prima facie case
elements to regulate respective burdens and essential fairness.
The complaint that eliminating (or for that matter, retaining) the
separate assumption of risk defense will handicap plaintiff is merely a
191. This is the burden that defendant did not meet in Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 218
Cal. App. 3d 36, 49-50, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 743 (1990), accepted for review, Supreme Ct. No.
S014818.
192. Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 18, at 239; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496G comments b and c.
193. James II, supra note 10, at 195-97, rebuts arguments that plaintiffs benefit by the
separate doctrine of assumption of risk because it is defendant's burden to prove.
194. See James I, supra note 141, at 142.
195. James II, supra note 10, at 192.
196. See James I, supra note 141, at 152.
197. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
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tangential concern. What ultimately will make any difference is the defi-
nition of what duty is owed and what causation is called "proximate." A
defense of implied assumption of a reasonable risk only adds repetitive
doctrine, clouding the fundamental fairness issues at stake. If duty stan-
dards are sufficiently broad and inclusive, it will be fair to leave plaintiff
with the burden of proof. If the duty standards (and analysis of the rest
of the prima facie case) are also fair enough to defendants, then they will
not miss the opportunity to litigate issues that would have been raised by
an implied assumption of risk defense.
Conclusion
Implied assumption of a reasonable risk is a superfluous doctrine.
Its elements are accounted for already in the negligence prima facie case
and existing comparative fault defense. Plaintiffs should be responsible
for their reasonable behavior, which can be analyzed under comparative
fault principles; no separate defense is needed.
It is time for the California Supreme Court to abolish the doctrine of
implied assumption of a reasonable risk. It serves no purpose in tort
jurisprudence that cannot be analytically accomplished through the ex-
isting prima facie case and comparison of fault. The continued presence
of the separate defense creates unnecessary confusion that diverts judicial
attention from a more straightforward analysis of cases.
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